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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
Case No. 
15413 
CHRIS DEAN BENDER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a criminal proceeding in which the 
appellant, Chris Dean Bender, was charged with the crime 
of theft in the third degree in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-403 (1953) , as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried by a jury on March 3, 1977, 
before the Honorable James s. Sawaya, and found guilty of 
theft in the third degree. Appellant was sentenced to 
an indeterminate term as provided by law and placed on 
probation. As terms of that probation, the appellant is 
required to reside at the Community Correction Center 
(Halfway House) until released by that facility. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmation of the conviction 
and judgment rendered below. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Francis Hayes, an employee of Chalk Garden, a 
woman's clothing store located in Salt Lake City, testified 
that on December 21, 1976, she had just arrived at work 
when she first noticed the appellant in one of the Chalk 
Garden's dressing rooms (T.3). At that time, Ms. Hayes 
saw the appellant 11 kind of bent over, • putting 
something in a big paper bag. 11 ( T. 5) • The article being_. 
put into the bag was identified as being a leather coat 
belonging to the Chalk Garden (T.24-25). The sack into 
which the coat was put by the appellant was not one of 
the vanity used by the Chalk Garden, but was one used by 
ZCMI Department Stores (T.21). 
After contacting John Bernard, owner and manager 
of the Chalk Garden, concerning what she had seen the 
appellant do, Ms. Hayes returned to the dressing room in 
which the appellant had concealed the leather coat in the 
ZCMI bag, and found a hanger (T. 7) • The hanger was wooden, 
and was of the type used by the Chalk Garden for the more 
expensive merchandise (T. 7). Ms. Hayes testified that the 
employees usually tried to keep all hangers cleared out of 
-2-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the dressing rooms so as to know exactly which articles 
go in the dressing rooms and which came back out (T.7). 
Further testimony by Ms. Hayes revealed that 
the appellant, upon leaving the dressing room and with 
the coat in the ZCMI sack, stopped and looked at some 
pants on a rack, as he was approaching the front of the 
store (T.7,14). 
John Bernard, upon being contacted by Ms. Hayes, 
followed the appellant from the dressing room, past the 
check out area (cash register), to the front of the 
store. He saw the appellant stop at the cash register 
area, engage in a brief conversation with someone (T.20), 
then proceed towards the front door (T.20). It was at 
this point that Mr. Bernard stopped the appellant, asking 
him if he (appellant) would show what was contained in the 
sack (T.20). Bernard then took the sack and looked into 
it, seeing the coat which belonged to Chalk Garden (T.21). 
The appellant told Mr. Bernard that he had purchased the 
coat at ZCMI (T.21). He repeated this statement several 
times (T.22), but later changed his story, saying that he 
wanted or intended to purchase the garment (coat) from 
Chalk Garden (T.23). 
On cross-examination, Mr. Bernard testified that 
he did not stop appellant immediately after he came out 
of the dressing room, because he wanted to give appellant 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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a chance to pay for the merchandise at the cash register 
counter {T.38-39). The same reason was given for not 
stopping or approaching the appellant at the cash register 
counter {T.39). Bernard also testified that after the 
appellant passed the check out counter, appellant was in 
the process of walking directly out of the store, and 
did not stop to browse or look at any of the merchandise 
located in the front of the store near the entrance-exit 
(T.48). 
The appellant took the stand in his own behalf, 
and testified that he had been resting on a bench in the 
Chalk Garden when he noticed a woman leave the ZCMI bag in 
the dressing room {T. 53-54) • His testimony was that he wen: 
over to the dressing room, closed the sack, picked it up, 
and proceeded to the counter {T.55). He related that he 
told a sales lady at the checkout counter that he thought 
a woman had left the bag with the coat in it {T.55). No 
response came from the sales lady, according to appellant 
(T.55). It was at this time, testified Bender, that Mr. 
Bernard came up to him and grabbed the bag (T.55). 
On cross-examination, it was brought out that 
the appellant did not attempt to alert the lady he supposed! 
saw leave the dressing room to the fact that she had forgot'. 
her bag with the coat inside {T.59). It was also pointed 
out that once the appellant took possession of the bag, he 
-4- « 
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was in no hurry to either notify the lady that she had 
left her bag (assuming arguendo that there was in fact 
such a woman), or to proceed to the checkout counter for 
purposes of notifying a sales lady of the situation 
(T.59-60). 
Having been apprehended by John Bernard, appellant 
was subsequently turned over to security police in Trolley 
Square. They in turn delivered him to Officer Sheya of 
the Salt Lake City Police Department (T.28-29). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO GIVE 
APPELLANT'S PROFFERED JURY INSTRUCTION ON THE LESSER 
INCLUDED OFFENSE OF ATTEMPTED THEFT. 
Subsequent to reading of the Insturctions to the 
jury by the court and closing arguments by the respective 
attorneys, appellant took exception to the court's denial 
of his request to have an attempted theft instruction given 
(T.66,67). (It should be noted that both counsel, upon 
suggestion by the court, stipulated that exceptions to the 
court's instructions be taken after the jury had retired 
to deliberate [T.66].) 
The appellant's requested instruction read as 
follows: 
-5-
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"In the event that you have a 
reasonable doubt as to Mr. Bender's 
guilt as to the crime of theft, you 
may then consider whether or not Mr. 
Bender is guilty of attempted theft. 
Before you would be warranted in 
convicting Mr. Bender of attempted 
theft, the State must prove each and 
every one of the following essential 
elements of that crime: 
1. That on or about December 21, 
1976, the said CHRIS DEAN BENDER did 
attempt to obtain or exercise unauthorized 
control over the property of the Chalk 
Garden. 
2. That he at tempted to obtain the 
property with the purpose to deprive the 
said Chalk Garden of said property. 
3. That said property had a value 
in excess of $250.00 but less than 
than $1, 000. 00 lawful money of the United--
States. 
4. That such acts occurred in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah. 
Mr. Bender's plea of not guilty 
thereby casts upon the State the burden 
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each 
and all of the foregoing essential ele-
ments. Thus, before you can convict Mr. 
Bender of the crime of attempted theft, 
you must find from the evidence, beyond 
a reasonable doubt, each and every one 
of the foregoing elements. If you find 
that the evidence has failed to prove 
any one or more of these essential 
elements to your satisfaction beyond 
a reasonable doubt, then it is your duty 
to acquit Mr. Bender." (R. 30). 
Appellant contends that it was prejudicial error 
for the court to omit instructing the jury on the lesser 
included offense of attempted theft. A review of existing 
statutory and case law leads to the conclusion that the 
. d . structi lower court's ruling refusing the lesser include in 
was proper. 
-6-
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-33-6 (1953), as amended, 
which appellant cites as imposing on the court an 
obligation to give an instruction on the lesser included 
offense, reads: 
"The jury may find the defendant 
guilty of any offense the commission of 
which is necessarily included in that 
with which he is charged in the indict-
ment or information, or of. an attempt 
to commit the offense." 
As the appellant correctly states in his brief, the Utah 
Supreme Court has recently interpreted, in State v. Pierre, 
Supreme Court No. 13903, November 25, 1977, the above 
section to be subject to the modification of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-1-402(4) (1953), as amended, which states: 
"The court shall not be 
obligated to charge the jury with 
respect to an included offense unless 
there is a rational basis for a 
verdict acquitting the defendant of 
the offense charged and convicting him 
of the excluded offense." 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-33-6 (1953), as amended, read 
in conjunction with Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4) (1953), as 
amended, as required by State v. Pierre, supra, clearly does 
not impose any obligation on the court to give a lesser 
included instruction on an attempt. 
A review of Utah case law, even before the enact-
ment of Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4) (1953), as amended, 
-7-
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and the recent decision in Pierre, discloses that the lbi 
the giving of lesser included offense and attempt instruct: 
has not really changed, and the enactment of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-1-402 (4) (1953), as amended, really codified the exist 
case law at the time of its enactment. 
As early as 1889, this Court in People v. Robi~ 
6 Utah 101, 21 Pac. 403 (1889), held that it is not always 
necessary that the court instruct the jury as to all lesser 
offenses, even though they may be embraced within the char1: 
set forth in the indictment, and of which the defendant mi1 
be convicted. 
In 19 2 3, the foundation for the present state of 
law of lesser included instructions was laid in State v. 
Angle, et al., 61 Utah 432, 215 Pac. 531, 532 {1923). Ther 
the defendant was convicted of grand larceny. On appeal, h 
argued that the trial court erred in refusing to grant a ju 
instruction on petit larceny. In affirming the lower court 
decision, the Utah Supreme Court said: 
" ••• It is argued that because 
larceny is divided into two degrees, 
grand larceny, a felony, and petit. 
larceny, a misdemeanor, the court in 
its charge should have covered th~ 
offenses included in the information. 
It is a well-settled rule that 
instructions as to lower grades of 
the offense charged should be given 
when warranted by the evidence. 
-8-
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It is equally well settled that 
in a criminal prosecution error 
cannot be predicated on the 
omission of the trial court to 
instruct as to lesser grades of 
the offense charged where there 
is no evidence to reduce the 
offense to a lesser grade." 21S 
Pac. at S321, S32. (Emphasis 
added.) 
This principle of law set forth in Angle was reaffirmed later 
in State v. Ferguson, 74 Utah 263, 279 Pac. SS, S6 (1929), and 
State v. Dodge, 19 Utah 2d 44, 42S P.2d 781, 782 (1967). 
In State v. Mitchell, 3 Utah 2d 70, 278 P.2d 618, 621 
(19SS), the Supreme Court of Utah, in affirming a conviction 
of second degree murder, again cited State v. Angle, supra, 
and declared: 
" ••• Nor is it always the 
duty of the court to instruct on the 
lesser offenses,--for example, where 
either a conviction or outright acquittal 
of a particular offense is mandatory, 
leaving no room to hold an accused for 
any other offense. Nor must the court 
always instruct as to lesser offenses 
whether requested so to do or not •••• " 
Turning to more modern day decisions, it is evident 
that this Honorable Court has not seen fit to alter the 
principle of law set forth in Angle. 
In State v. Ash, 23 Utah 2d 14, 4S6 P.2d 154 (1969), 
the defendant was convicted of grand larceny of an automobile. 
The evidence disclosed that he had left the motel where he 
was lodging, driving another person's car. He was subsequently 
-9-
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chased down by a deputy sheriff. In the car defendant 
was driving was found shaving equipment, underwear, a gun 
and some gun shells. On appeal, the defendant alleged errc 
in that the trial court failed to instruct as to the lesser 
offense of driving a vehicle without the owner's consent 
and with intent to temporarily deprive the owner of 
possession. The Utah Supreme Court rejected this contentic 
by appellant: 
11 
••• the defendant could not 
have been prejudiced by a failure 
to have the jury consider whether 
his intent was to deprive the owner 
of the use of his car temporarily 
because the court clearly told the 
jury to find the defendant not guilty 
if they failed to find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that he intended 
to deprive the owner permanently of 
the use of the car. 11 456 P. 2d at 155. 
Subsequent to State v. Ash, supra, this Court hel 
in State v. McCarthy, 25 Utah 2d 425, 483 P. 2d 890, 891 
(1971): 
11 
••• when parties so request, 
they are entitled to instructions on 
their theory of the case, including 
the submission of lesser included 
offenses. However, this is true only 
where there is some reasonable basis 
in the evidence to justify the givin~. 
of such instructions. • • • 11 (Emphasis 
added.) 
Later in 1971, in State v. Harris, 26 Utah 2d 
361 
489 P. 2d 1008 (1971), a robbery-rape-kidnapping case, it Wi 
-10-
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held that where, under any reasonable view of evidence, the 
defendant was either guilty of the greater offense or not 
guilty, instructions as to lesser included offenses would 
have only confused issues, and thus it was not reversible 
error for the court to refuse to instruct on lesser included 
offenses. Speaking at 489 P.2d 1001, the Court said, quoting 
from State v. Gillian, 23 Utah 2d 372, 463 P.2d 811, 814 
(1970): 
"' ••• where the question raised 
relates to the refusal to submit 
included offenses, it is our duty to 
survey the whole evidence and the 
inferences naturally to be deduced 
therefrom to see whether there is any 
reasonable basis therein which would 
support a conviction of the lesser 
offenses.'" 
In the concluding paragraph in Harris, the Court said: 
"In the instant case, under any 
reasonable view of the evidence, the 
defendant must be found either guilty 
of the greater offense or not guilty. 
Under such circumstances, instructions 
as to lesser offenses would only confuse." 
489 P.2d at 1011. 
It can thus be said in summary of the heretofore 
cited cases that, even without considering Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-1-402 (4) (1953), as amended, State v. Pierre, supra, 
and State v. Dougherty, 550 P.2d 175 (Utah 1976) (to be 
discussed hereinafter), all of which lend credence to the 
above cases, the law in Utah has tended toward exclusion of 
lesser included offense instruction if the following 
-11-
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situations exist: ( 1) there is no reasonable bas is for the 
instructions, i.e., there is no reasonable basis on which 
to reduce the greater offense {State v. Harris, supra; ~ 
v. McCarthy, supra; State v. Angle, supra; State v. Gillian, 
supra); (2) the evidence warrants either a guilty or not 
guilty verdict on the greater offense {State v. Mitchell, 
supra; State v. Harris, supra) 1 (3) the giving of lesser 
included instructions would tend to confuse the jury 
(State v. Harris, supra). 
Perhaps one of the most recent enlightening cases 
on the subject of lesser included instructions is Statev. 
Dougherty, supra. There, the defendant was convicted of th1 
crime of unlawful distribution for value of a controlled 
substance. He appealed, alleging that the trial court em 
in refusing to give an instruction on the lesser included 
offense of possession of a controlled substance. In 
affirming the conviction, this Honorable Court held that 
where defense testimony could prove only complete innocence, 
the defendant was not entitled to an instruction on the 
lesser included offense. 
Testimony in Dougherty revealed that an undercove! 
agent, Woolsey, had negotiated with a Ms. Keller over the 
-12-
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telephone regarding the purchase of some marijuana. That 
night, Woolsey went to Ms. Keller's apartment, paid $90 
to her and received the marijuana. They both left the 
apartment together, and subsequently encountered the 
defendant in front of Ms. Keller's apartment. Prior to 
this encounter, Woolsey had returned the marijuana to 
Ms. Keller. Upon seeing the defendant, Ms. Keller gave 
the money and marijuana to the defendant, who in turn 
gave the bag to Woolsey. No negotiations were made with 
the defendant regarding the purchase. Ms. Keller's 
testimony denied most of the testimony of Woolsey_._ 
In referring to Utah Code Ann. § 77-33-6 (1953), 
as amended, the Court said at 550 P.2d 176: 
"This statute, we have said, requires 
instructions on lesser included offenses, 
when the evidence and circumstances justify. 
When an appellant makes an issue of a 
refusal to instruct on included offenses, 
we will survey the evidence, and the 
inferences which admit of rational 
deduction, to determine if there exists 
reasonable basis upon which a conviction 
of the lesser offense could rest. No 
such basis exists here." 
In referring to the contradictory testimony of 
Woolsey and Ms. Keller, the Court further said at 550 
P.2d 177: 
"The defense testimony could only 
prove complete innocence. Appellant's 
reason for his exception to the court's 
-13-
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refusal to give the instruction is 
the jury by selectively evaluating 
the facts as is their province, could 
well have determined the defendant 
was in possession of the marijuana 
in question at a time sufficient to 
render him guilty of possession only. 
Such a theory is not available to him 
where the record shows he could only 
be found guilty or not guilty of the 
crime charged." 
In its opinion, the Court very clearly enunciate~ 
the three situations in which the problem of lesser include 
offenses are frequently encountered: 
" ••• First, where there is 
evidence which would absolve the 
defendant from guilt of a greater 
offense, or degree, but would support 
a finding of guilt of a lesser offense, 
or degree: the instruction is mandatory. 
Second, where the evidence would 
not support a finding of guilt in the 
commission of the lesser offense or 
degree. For example, the defendant 
denies any complicity in the crime 
charged, and thus lays no foundation 
for any intermediate verdict, or where 
the elements of the offense differ, 
and some element essential to the 
lesser offense is either not proved 
or shown not to exist. This second 
situation renders an instruction on a 
lesser included offense erroneous, 
because it is not pertinent. 
Third, is an intermediate situa-
tion. One where the elements of 
the greater offense include all the 
-14-
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elements of the lesser offense; 
because, by its very nature, the 
greater offense could not have 
been committed without defendant 
having the intent in doing the 
acts, which constitute the lesser 
offense. In such a situation 
instructions on the lesser 
included offense may be given 
because all elements of the lesser 
offense have been proved. However, 
such an instruction may properly 
be refused if the prosecution has 
met its burden of proof of the 
greater offense, and there is 
no evidence tending to reduce the 
greater offense." 550 P.2d at 
176, 177. (Emphasis added.) 
Subsequent to Dougherty, the Utah Supreme Court 
in State v. Bell, 563 P.2d 186 (Utah 1977), affirmed the 
principles set forth in Dougherty, declaring the state of 
the law as it presently exists: 
-15-
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" .. The trial court should give 
the instructions for lesser included · 
offenses whenever, by any reasonable 
view of the evidence, the defendant 
would be guilty of the lesser included 
offense. The instructions for included 
offenses may be properly refused if the 
prosecution has met its burden of proof 
on the greater offense and there is no 
evidence tending to reduce the greater 
offense." 563 P.2d at 188. 
The Court added a very significant comment at 563 P. 2d 188: 
"Whenever this court believes 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error 
in not giving the instruction would not 
have affected the verdict the case 
should not be reversed .•• " 
The question to be decided by this Court is ~~~ 
or not, according to §76-1-402 (4), Utah Code Ann .. (1953.)_(i:. 
amended) , there was a rational basis for a verdict acquittir. 
the defendant of the offense of theft and convicting him of 
attempted theft. 
In order to arrive at such a decision, Utah Code! 
§76-6-404 (1953) (as amended), the section under which appe! 
was convicted (in conj unction with· Utah Code Ann. §76-6-403 
(1953) (as amended)), must be analyzed in light of the evid0• 
addressed at the trial. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (1953) (as amended) read; 
"A person commits theft if he obtains 
or exercises unauthorized control over the 
property of another with a purpose to de-
prive him thereof." 
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The evidence in the case at bar indicates that the 
appellant was in control and possession of property belonging 
to the Chalk Garden (T.24,25); that he did not have permission 
or authorization from the Chalk Garden to be in possession of 
the property in question (T.29); the value of the property in 
question was over $250.00 but less than $1,000.00 (T.26); and 
that the obtaining or exercising of control over the property 
belonging to the Chalk Garden was for the purpose of permanently 
depriving them (Chalk Garden) thereof (this intent can be 
deducted by the jury from several of the actions of the defendant, 
to-wit: stuffing the coat in the shopping bag different from 
ones used by the Chalk Garden (T.5); changing "stories" con-
cerning the explanation of why appellant was in possession of 
the coat (T.22,23); taking the coat past the check-out counter 
without attempting to pay for it and being apprehended shortly 
before reaching the exit (T.19-20) ). Appellant admits in his 
brief all of the factual items above except for the testimony 
regarding the statements allegedly made to Mr. Bernard, owner 
of the Chalk Garden, regarding the explanation as to why appellant 
had a coat belonging to Chalk Garden concealed in a ZCMI bag. 
Thus, the only item in dispute is the element concerning the 
intent to permanently deprive the Chalk Garden of possession 
of the item in question. 
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The issue of intent being the only one in 
con ten. 
tion, it can be seen from appellant's own testimony that h' 
presented an "all or nothing" issue to the J'ury th on e issu 
of intent. He alleges that he saw a lady leave the sack w: 
the coat in it in a Chalk Garden dressing room (T.54), & 
subsequently took possession of the sack and attempted to 
depart from Chalk Garden, allegedly in an effort to run~K 
the woman who had left the sack (T.63). If this was in fac 
the case and the jury was inclined to so believe this versi 
of the story, then no conviction could stand either for the 
greater offense of theft or for the lesser offense of aUE 
theft, since there would be no criminal intent, which-o1"1r. 
must be present for a conviction in either case. On the of 
hand, if the jury believed, as they apparently did, the 
evidence presented .by the prosecution, the requisite intent 
to permanently deprive can be found and the conviction for 
the greater offense of theft would stand. Therefore, s~~ 
there is no factual dispute as to whether or not the appell 
had possession of the coat in question, without proper auth: 
tion, and since no dispute exists as to the value thereof 0 
the coat, the only issue to be decided was the one of inter: 
Due to appellant's own testimony and version of the sequenc, 
I 
of events, the jury is placed in a position of either decia 
that there was an intent to permanently deprive, or there 1 
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an honest effort to return a sack with a coat in it that 
belonged to another lady, in which case there could be no 
criminal intent. It should be noted that the same reasoning 
applies to the issue of authorization. If the jury believed 
that the coat was indeed left by a woman in the dressing room 
and that the appellant was indeed performing his role of the 
"Good Samaritan" by seeking to return it, no unauthorized 
control could be present, thus another essential element of 
of the crime of theft and attempted theft (attempted unauthorized 
control) would be lacking. 
As heretofor reasoned, the jury was placed in a 
position of either convicting the appellant of theft or 
acquitting him. The evidence presented no other choice. As 
such, the case falls directly under the guidelines of State v. 
Dougherty, where the Court declared, "The defense testimony 
could only prove complete innocence." There, as here, the 
appellant tried to proceed on a lesser included offense theory, 
but this was rejected by the Court: 
" .•• Such a theory is not available 
to him where the record shows he could 
only be found guilty or not guilty of the 
crime charged." 550 P.2d at 177. 
It can be said, therefore, that under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-1-402 (4) (1953) (as amended), the trial court in the case 
at bar was not obliged to instruct as to an included offense, 
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because even though the jury may have chosen to belie~~ 
appellant, thereby acquitting him, no evidentiary basis 
existed upon which a conviction of an attempted theft couJc 
stand. Since Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (4) is stated in th, 
conjunctive, both statutory requisites must be present befc 
the trial would be required to instruct·on the included 
offense of attempt. 
Finally, these comments should be made in refern 
to appellant's allegations. First, the allegation in hist: 
that he never left the Chalk Garden, therefore no asportati! 
causing the case at bar to fall within the purview of the f: 
situation discussed by the Court in Dougherty, is total-l.Ji-
without merit. The necessary asportation was fulfill~~r 
appellant concealed the coat in the ZC.MI bag and began waH· 
ing towards the exit. As will be discussed in Point III in 
this brief, the asportation question presented in Statev. 
Doherty, 29 Utah 2d 320, 509 P.2d 351 (1973), is very simila: 
in fact to the case at bar, and was sufficient in law ~fu 
the requirements of being one of the necessary elements of 
larceny. As will be later discussed, this Court has heWc 
more than one occasion that the removal of an object from e 
place where the property is found is sufficient asportatio~ 
to support a larceny charge. State v. Richards, 3 Utah Zd 
284 P.2d 691 (1955); State v. Doherty, supra. 
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Second, appellant's allegation that his case falls 
within the third situation referred to by the Court in 
Dougherty is without merit. Under such a situation, proffered 
lesser instructions may properly be refused by the court if 
the prosecution has met its burden of proof on the greater 
offense. Without being repetitious, the evidence heretofor 
cited and presented to the jury was more than enough to enable 
the prosecution to fulfill its burden. 
Third, and perhaps most important of all, appellant's 
proffered instruction on attempted theft was not warranted by 
the evidence, and thus could not as a matter of law be given. 
Appellant's instruction alleges that he did "attempt to obtain 
or exercise unauthorized control over the property" and 
"attempted to obtain the property with the purpose to deprive. 
of said property." The instruction as proposed by appellant 
is ~-mrded in a fashion which would lead one to beli·eve that 
the appellant did take steps leading towards the goal of 
exercising control over the said property, but was stopped short 
of accomplishing such a goal. Since the facts, as admitted by 
appellant himself, establish that he did in fact have control 
over the property in question, and since appellant, by his own 
testimony, claims that this control was authorized (implied 
authorization since he alleges he was attempting to return 
something to the rightful owner), then his proffered instruction 
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is self-contradictory, and as a matter of law incapable 
of being given. It is questionable also, whether or not 
such an instruction as proposed by appellant would meet 
other qualifications set forth in the attempt statute, ~~ 
Code Ann. §76-4-101, (1953) (as amended). 
For the reasons heretofore cited, it is the con-
clusion of respondent that the trial court did not err in 
refusing to instruct on attempted theft. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO INSTRC: 
THE JURY ON REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESIS. 
At the trial, appellant submitted a jury ins~ 
on reasonable alternative hypothesis, which reads as follo11 
"To warrant you in .convicting the 
defendant of the crime charged in the 
complaint, the evidence must, to your 
minds, exclude every reasonable hypothesis 
other than the guilt of the defendant; 
that is to say, if after a full and fair 
consideration and comparison of all the 
testimony in the case you can reasonably 
explain the facts in evidence on any 
other reasonable ground other than the 
guilt of Mr. Bender, then you must 
acquit him." (R.31) 
The court refused to give the instruction, and rightly so. 
The law in Utah as to the giving of a jury instrui 
on reasonable alternative hypothesis was stated in Stat~ 
Fort, Supreme Court No. 15197, Dec. 22, 1977, and in~ 
Garcia, 11 Utah 2d 67, 355 P.2d 57,59,60 (1960): 
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.. where the only proof of 
material fact or one which is a necessary 
element of defendant's guilt consists of 
circumstantial evidence, such circumstances 
must reasonably preclude every reasonable 
hypothesis of defendant's innocence .•• 
. . . this rule is applicable only 
where the proof of a material issue is 
based solely on circumstantial evidence. " 
(Emphasis added~) 
The principle was cited and reaffirmed in State v. 
Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255, 470 P.2d 246, 247 (1970); State v. Romero, 
554 P.2d 216 (Utah 1976); and State v. Dumas, 554 P.2d 1313 
(Utah 1976). In Romero, the Court reaffirmed that even if only 
a portion of the evidence is circumstantial, a reasonable 
hypothesis instruction is not required: 
"When the only proof of presumed 
facts consists of circumstantial evidence, 
the circumstances must reasonably preclude 
every reasonabl~ hypothesis of defendant's 
innocence, but this is not controlling 
when only part of the evidence is cir-
cumstantial. " 554 P. 2d at 219. (Emphasis 
added, l 
In Schad, supra, the Court, in referring to the rule 
of law concerning reasonable hypothesis instructions where the 
conviction is to be based upon circumstantial evidence, declared 
that such a proposition did not and does not apply to each 
circumstance separately: 
" .•. where a conviction is based 
on circumstantial evidence, the evidence 
should be looked upon with caution, and. : • 
it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis 
except the guilt of defendant •• • 
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Nevertheless, that proposition does 
not ~pply to each.ci:cumstance separately, 
but is a matter within the prerogative of 
the jury to determine from all of the facts 
and circumstances shown;. " 470 P.2d 
at 247. 
This Court in Schad also stated the rule by whit 
it is bound when receiving such a case as the on e present!) 
before it: 
" .Unless upon our review of the 
evidence, and the reasonable inferences 
fairly to be deduced therefrom, it appears 
that there is no reasonable basis therein 
for such a conclusion. (referring 
to the fact that the evidence must exclude 
every reasonable hypothesis except guilt 
of defendant) .we should not over-
turn the verdict." 470 P.2d at 247. 
Applying the law cited hereto for to the facts of: 
case at hand, it can be seen that appellant's request fma 
reasonable hypothesis instruction was properly denied. Fir! 
there was no circumstantial evidence. All of the testimony 
the prosecution's case was based totally on the eyewitness 
accounts of Ms. Hayes and Mr. Bernard. Second, the case bo: 
down simply to a question of whether or not the jury belieVi 
the prosecution's version or the appellant's. As such, it• 
the exclusive prerogative of the jury to decide which versii 
or portion thereof, to believe. State v. Wilson, 565 P.~t 
(Utah 1977); State 
In State 
v. Mills, 530 P. 2d 1272 (Utah 1975) · 
.. 2d 481 
v. Hopkins, 11 Utah 2d 363, 359 P. 
-24-
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(1961), a similar situation to the one presented before this 
court existed in that the defendant's version was totally 
different from that of the prosecution's, especially as to 
the issue of intent. There, the Court refused to give a reason-
able hypothesis instruction, saying that the jury must decide 
which version of the evidence to believe: 
"The difficulty with defendant's 
position is that the rule he relies on 
is not applicable. where, as here, there 
is dispute in the evidence and one 
version thereof does not support his 
thesis. He errs in assuming that the 
jury was obliged to believe his story 
as to what happened .•• " 359 P.2d at 
487. 
Appellant, in the case at bar, alleges that the State 
presented no evidence which overtly reflected on his intent, 
and as such, the evidence is subject to alternative conclusion, 
one resulting in a finding of innocence and the other in guilt. 
As the Court said in Hopkins, supra, at 359 P.2d 487: 
"It is to be remembered that 
intent, being a state of mind, is 
rarely susceptible of direct proof. 
But it can be inferred from conduct 
and attendant circumstances in the 
light of human behavior and 
experience .•. " 
In the present case, testimony was given by Mr. Bernard, owner 
of the store, that the appellant, when apprehended with the 
Chalk Garden coat concealed in the ZCMI bag, said that he 
(appellant) had purchased the coat at ZCMI (T.21). Bernard said 
that appellant shortly after that changed his story, saying 
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-that he intended to purchase the garment from Chalk Garden 
(T.23). The appellant denied ever making such statements 
(T. 64). It was the jury's function to decide which witnes; 
to believe. Certainly the above statements, along wi~lli 
fact that Ms. Hayes testified to seeing the appellant stuff 
the coat into a ZCMI bag in the dressing room (T. 5), give 
the jury more than sufficient room with which to find an ir, 
to permanently deprive. 
Coupled with the hereto for cited testimony is the 
testimony that the appellant did not attempt to pay for the 
coat at the cash register, nor did he have any explanation, 
much less a reasonable one, to the questions propound~J!: 
as to why he did not immediately attempt to notify the supr. 
lady, who left her bag, that she had in fact done so. Appe: 
did not seem to be in a hurry to chase down the forgetful 
woman even after he had apprehended the bag with the coat i: 
The jury thus had testimony from two eyewitnesses 
from which it could easily find evidence of felonious inten: 
It could also have rejected such testimony and accept~UE 
pres.ented by the appellant. Apparently, the choice was madi 
to believe the testimony of the State's witnesses, finfil~ 
therefore that the appellant's actions were done with felon: 
· merely exerc;s;ng its functii intent. As such, the Jury was i i 
in such a case where felonious intent was an issue. ~ 
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Richards, supra, at 284 P.2d 692; State v. Peterson, 110 
Utah 413, 174 P.2d 843, 845 (1946). 
Due to the fact that the evidence presented was 
not totally circumstantial, either collectively or on any 
single issue, and because two different versions of the 
evidence were presented to jury, neither version being based 
on circumstantial evidence, the Court was therefore not 
required to instruct the jury on reasonable alternative 
hypothesis. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE CONVICTION 
OF THEFT. 
Appellant alleges that the evidence was insufficient 
to sustain a conviction. The standard for determining sufficiency 
was enumerated in State v. Romero, supra, at 554 P.2d 219: 
"This court has set the standard 
for determining sufficiency of evidence 
to require that it be so inconclusive or 
so inherently improbable that reasonable 
minds could not reasonably believe defendant 
had committed a crime. Unless there is 
a clear showing of lack of evidence, the 
jury verdict will be upheld." 
The Court had earlier in its Romero opinion declared that its 
function was not to judge the weight of the evidence or 
credibility of the witnesses: 
"This court has long upheld the 
standard that on an appeal from con-
viction the court cannot weigh the 
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-evidence nor say what guarantee is 
necessary to establish a fact beyond 
a reasonable doubt so long as the 
evidence given is substantial. Further, 
this court has maintained that its 
function is not to determine guilt 
or innocence, the weight to give con-
flicting evidence, the credibility of 
witnesses, or the weight to be given 
defendant's testimony." 554 P.2d at 218 
In reviewing this case, this Court must survey ar. 
review the evidence in the light most favorable to the juri 
verdict, State v. Helm, 563 P. 2d 794, 796 (Utah 1977); ~ 
v. Sinclair, 15 Utah 2d 162, 389 P.2d 465 (1964), and dis· 
regard any errors which do not substantially prejudice the 
rights of the appellant, State v. Sinclair, supra; Utah Coe 
Ann. § 77-42-1 (1953) (as amended). Under Utah Code Anir.-' 
§ 77-42-1, a presumption exists to the effect that any em 
found is presumed not to have resulted in prejudice. 
Perhaps one of the most accurate and concise SUl!l 
tions as to the function of an appellate court in reviewinj 
jury verdict is to be found in State v. McCarthy, supra, 4i 
P.2d at 892. There, the court quoted from Jacob v. Citt.2!. 
York, 315 U.S. 752, 62 S.Ct. 854, 86 L.Ed 1166 (1942), wher 
Justice Murphy said: 
"'· .. The right of jury trial .. · 
is ... a right so fundamental and saared 
to the citizens ... [that it] should be 
jealously guarded by the courts.' Never-
theless, once t~is right has been honored 
and its purpose accomplished, the result-
ing verdict and judgment should be 
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accorded such dignity and respect 
as to give it some solidarity. This 
requires that it not be upset unless 
there is error of sufficient substance 
that it may have had some material 
effect upon the proceeding so that 
there is a reasonable likelihood 
that an injustice resulted." 
In review of the evidence, there is no question as 
to the fact that the evidence presented was sufficient to meet 
the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1953) (as 
amended) . 
First, appellant himself admits that he had possession 
of the coat belonging to the Chalk Garden (T.54). Second, the 
testimony presented by the owner of the Chalk Garden established 
that the appellant did not have permission to be in possession 
of the coat (T.29). Third, the value and ownership of the 
property was established by the owner, John Bernard (ownership, 
T.24,25; value, T.26). Fourth, the intent to permanently deprive 
the Chalk Garden of the ownership or control of the coat was 
established by the actions and statements of the appellant (see 
Point II for specific discussion). Lastly, the asportation 
necessary was fulfilled when the appellant concealed (as much 
as possible) the coat in the bag and proceeded towards the exit, 
after having stopped momentarily at the check stand to speak to 
someone. 
The facts in the case at bar are very similar to 
those in State v. Doherty, supra, where the court held that 
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there was a sufficient showing of asportation when the 
defendant took a gun out of his pocket and dropped it on 
a counter, even though the gun was not carried past the 
check stand or from the premises. The gun had previously 
been removed from a gun case in the store, but there was n( 
evidence that the defendant had himself removed the gun fa 
the case. The Court in Doherty reaffirmed the holding in 
State v. Richards, supra, that the removal of an object frc· 
the place where it is found is sufficient to constitute 
asportation. 
In the present case, the appellant was seen puttt 
the coat into the ZCMI bag; was seen carrying it towards4!< 
exit, without having paid for it. Certainly this evidence1 
even stronger claims of asportation then even in Doherty. 
The present case does not lack any evidence on wt, 
to convict the appellant of theft. The elements of the crw 
were given to the jury (R. 24). It was the responsibilityc: 
the jury to determine whether the elements of the crime wer 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, State v. Coffey, 564 PJ 
(Utah 19 7 7) . Apparently the jury found the State's evidenc: 
vincing beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellant had a ful 
and fair trial. l' d The proceedings are presumed to be va 1 ' 
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state v. Valdez, 19 Utah 2d 426, 432 P.2d 53, 55 (1967), and 
are in fact so found to be based upon the evidence and law 
applicable thereto. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons heretofore cited, the conviction 
should be affirmed by this Honorable Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
-------------
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